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REVIEWS'S
Bailey case,2 she concludes that "in few cases . . . has an opinion been de-
livered which can safely be treated as that of the Court." This, of course,
is a contradiction in terms, since the decision of the majority is the decision of
the Court, regardless of the nature or extent of dissenting opinions. She
characterizes the Government's position as a demand that national security
must outweigh claims of free speech and due process, and then attempts tk,
extricate herself from the resulting dilemma by extensive quotations from dis-
senting opinions or majority decisions subsequently reversed by a higher
court. Miss Bontecou would be much fairer to the reader if she stated frankly
the simple fact that there has yet been no final decision declaring any portion
of the Loyalty-Securitv Program to be unconstitutional other than the listing
of subversive organizations by the Attorney-General without notice or hearing.
And finally, notwithstanding the unquestioned documentary value of this
book, it is not light summer reading.
JoN HARLN .\MEN-;
CASES Ox SECURITY. Vol. II, Suretyship. By Edgar N. Durfee. Indianapolis:
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1953. Pp. xiii, 352. $6.00.
THE size of this book represents the shrinking attention given to suretyghip
in American law schools. Arant's Cases on Securiky (1926), for example.
contained 1074 pages while the book here reviewed has only 352 pages. The
tendency to eliminate suretyship as a separate course and to combine it vith
other subjects under such captions as "Security," "Security Transactions,"
and "Credit Transactions" goes on apace. Professor Durfee has recognized
this trend, and hedged against it by preparing his two-volume work entitled
"Cases on Security," segregating suretyship in the second volume, so that
the books may be used either in a combined or separate course.
The two volumes together cover the usual range of security transactions,
including mortgages of real, personal, and intangible property, pledges, con-
ditional sales, and trust receipts. The author has divided the two volumes
by including all of these devices in Volume I, and by restricting Volume II
generally to suretyship and "quasi-suretyship." All the transactions treated
in the first volume are legal devices "by which the creditor is given sume
sort of hold on a particular thing-land, goods, or intangibles. In this respect
suretyship is radically different. It gives the creditor no claim upon any
particular thing, but a claim against a particular person. . . ."I The author
calls the items covered in his Volume I "property security," and those in
Volume II "personal security." Quasi-suretyship, included in Volume II, is
defined by Professor Durfee as "things that are talked of as suretyship but
don't involve credit-lending."2 In this category he places transfers of mort-
2. Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (per curiam).
3. P. 220.
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gaged land and other properties and some other situations commented on
below.
Here reviewed is Volume II. In his introduction, Professor Durfee points
to the "needless confusion" in the law of suretyship resulting from careless-
ness in framing definitions. He then undertakes to resolve the confusion.
He does this by setting out the definitions arising from "two divergent ideas
of suretyship . . . I-Functional Definition of Suretyship and, II-Analogical
Definition of Suretyship-or Should We Say 'Quasi-Suretyship'?"a Efforts
to seek a satisfactory definition or description of suretyship produce some
colorful, "folksy" language: "These cases can't be sneezed away,"'4 and
"I don't mean to say that Judge Cooley was out of bounds."' While the use of
layman's language can be overdone, this reviewer feels that the average stu-
dent will absorb better, and remember longer writings which are cast in
striking rather than stilted, pedantic phrasing. Moreover the introduction
contains an extensive analysis of Judge Boldin's "functional" definition of
suretyship in Rollings v. Gunter: "Suretyship is the lending of credit to aid
a principal who has not sufficient credit of his own."" The author points out
the inadequacies and errors of this definition; in the process he discusses the
extension of credit by both "professional" and "amateur" sureties, the sale
of traveler's checks, the issuance of letters of credit, and gives a passing
glance at the "expensive mistake" of the "spurious distinction" between
suretyship and guaranty.
Under the caption "Analogical Definition of Suretyship," the author con-
siders Chief Justice Cooley's popular definition of suretyship in Smith v.
Shelden.7 Here Professor Durfee suggests revision of the definition, but
finally gives somewhat qualified approval to the two definitions, suggesting
later in his introduction that the student may, if he desires, disregard them
and "Try this-Suretyship is personal security."8  This last may well be
regarded as the principal theme of the book. The principal difficulty with
Professor Durfee's definition is that it would not be sufficiently broad to cover
those cases where both property and personal security are given to secure
the debt of the principal-a transaction usually regarded as a suretyship




6. 211 Ala. 671, 672, 101 So. 446, 448 (1924).
7. "A surety is a person who, being liable to pay a debt or perform an obligation, is
entitled, if it is enforced against him, to be indemnified by some other person, who ought
himself to have made payment before the surety was compelled to do so. It is immaterial
in what form the relation of principal and surety is established, or whether the creditor
is or is not contracted with in the two capacities, as is often the case when notes are
given or bonds taken; the relation is fixed by the arrangement and equities between the






The introduction is interestingly done, but I am not sure that it will dispel
the average student's confusion. And this, after all, was the author's objective
in writing it. He admits this limitation: "In final conclusion you'll perhapos
say that nothing comes clear except that, in practical effect, in cases covered.
there's little difference between the credit-lending idea [judge B3oldin's defini-
tion] and the personal security idea [Professor Durfee's definition], really a
microscopic difference compared to the spread between either of these ideas
and the Cooley idea, obligation plus the right of indemnity.'" I fear that at
this point Mr. Average Student will have only a lot of burning questions-
not really a bad result after all, if he will seek and find the answers.
The book is divided into three chapters. The first is entitled "Emphasi-
on Obligation of Surety to Creditor." This chapter comprises almo t half of
the entire book. It is divided into two sections: the first is entitled "Creation
of the Obligation- Scope of the Obligation." The cases placed here cover
the topic very well. An interesting departure from the some 65 page coverage
of the Statute of Frauds in the casebook this reviewer has been using 1 is the
author's dismissal of the Statute of Frauds in a two-page note.Y- He maintains
that "English and American judges have overlayed the statute with decisions
that now bury it as deep as the sands of the desert buried ancient Troy."'-
Hence he considers it a "plain waste of your time to learn the la, [Statute of
Frauds relative to suretyship] in any sense except to learn what to fear-
the method of the caveat, the technique of the bell-buoy." 4 He contents him-
self by referring the student to Corbin and Williston on the matter. I should
prefer a few cases, so that Professor Durfee's "caveat" would be dramatized
for the student
Section 2 of Chapter I is entitled "Secondary Liability" and is the loong-
est single division of the book. In 114 pages the author covers, inter a'ia, bill.,
for exoneration, actions for indemnity, guaranties, the Pain v. Pactard dee-
trine,15 some effects of the Negotiable Instruments Law, effect of principal's
infancy, fraud, duress, release of the principal, release of the co-surety, e: -
tension of time to the principal, laches and lack of diligence of the creditor,
third party beneficiaries, effect of change articles, etc. The cases are well
selected and the author has done an excellent job of covering a large field in
so few pages. Yet one could well quarrel with the inclusion of some of these
topics in Chapter I rather than in Chapter II, which deals with the rights and
remedies of the surety. The author anticipates this criticism: "At the begin-
ning of Chapter I, some loose remarks are made to the effect that everything
in Chapter I belongs in Chapter II and vice versa.' 01
10. Ibid.
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Chapter II is captioned "Emphasis on Surety's Rights and Remedies." The
inclusion of certain above-mentioned remedies in Chapter I, in the reviewer's
opinion, takes a great deal of the fire out of Chapter II. The first section of
Chapter II deals with the surety's rights and remedies "As against Creditor,
Principal, Creditors of Principal, and Transferees of Principal." Section 1
covers, inter alia, matters of subrogation, claims in bankruptcy against various
parties, effects of principal's bankruptcy on surety's obligation, and application
of funds. Section 2 "As Between Sureties" covers succinctly the rights and
remedies of the surety vis-d-vis the other sureties.
The third and final Chapter, "Emphasis on Quasi-Suretyship," includes ma-
terial which the author defines earlier as "things which are talked of as surety-
ship but don't involve credit-lending. '17 The first Section is entitled "A
Wrongful Act Imposes Liability on or Fixes a Lien on the Property of Two
or More Persons." Here Professor Durfee considers contribution among
involuntary sureties and joint tort-feasors, subrogation against third party
participants in the principal's default, contribution between indemnity-bond
insurers, and the like. The next Section of this Chapter is captioned "By a
Transfer of Mortgaged Land, the Burden is Placed on Two or More Persons:
Comparable Situations Involving Other Types of Liens and Other Kinds of
Property." Here is the only section of the book which contains a detailed out-
line of the sub-headings covered. In a few pages, the author comprehensively
covers the suretyship aspects of sales of property, real or personal, which are
encumbered by mortgages or other liens. A large portion of the last section
consists of note or text discussion.
For the statistically minded, the book contains 344 pages excluding the
indexes. Of these 344 pages, 46 pages are text, 298 pages cases and extensive
notes and questions. There are 69 cases reported at length and 137 cases di-
gested, quoted, or discussed. The volume appears sufficient for a one hour
per week course for a semester in Suretyship. To stretch it to two hours
would necessitate some outside work for the students. But the length is suf-
ficient for the time allowed in the average law school today.
Viewing the book as a whole, I find it well-prepared, nicely-balanced and
with a fine selection of cases. The notes are printed in a large type suitable
to the impaired vision of the usual law school professor. The cases provide
a reasonable apportionment between the "old faithfuls" and the more recent
decisions, thus consoling the professor with his old friends and giving the
student the feeling of "up-to-dateness." A large number of thought-provoking
questions appear in the notes. Professor Durfee is to be commended for pro-
ducing this little book, and I urge its thoughtful consideration by my colleagues
who may feel that it is time for a change.
E. BYRoN HILLBYt
17. P.v.
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